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CUPP V. NAUGHTEN AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
TRUTHFULNESS: BREATH OF NEW LIFE FOR A
VANISHING JURY INSTRUCTION
"Nobody can be ignorant, that belief is susceptible of different degrees of
strength, or intensity."
Jeremy Bentham, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence
I. Introduction
Hugh Kyle Naughten was tried in the Oregon state court of Multnomah
County for the crime of armed robbery. The state's principal evidence consisted
of testimony by the owner of a grocery store, James R. Livengood, that Naughten
robbed the store at gunpoint and of corroborative testimony by another eyewit-
ness, Larree E. Weissenfluh, a friend of the owner. In addition, two police
officers testified that Naughten had been found near the scene of the robbery
and that the stolen money was located near his car in a neighboring parking
lot. A few items of clothing identified as belonging to the defendant and the
stolen money were also introduced. Naughten neither took the stand himself
nor called any witnesses to testify in his behalf.-
After charging the jury that the defendant was presumed innocent "until
guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt," the trial judge then continued:
Every witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption may be
overcome by the manner in which the witness testifies, by the nature of his
or her testimony, by evidence affecting his or her character, interest or mo-
tives, by contradictory evidence or by a presumption. 2
The jury returned a verdict of guilty and Naughten was sentenced to a term in
the state penitentiary.
Naughten's conviction was affirmed by the Oregon Court of Appeals which
found, on the basis of State v. Kessler,' that utilization of the presumption of
truthfulness instruction was not erroneous. The Supreme Court of Oregon
denied a petition for review. Naughten, his state remedies being exhausted, then
sought federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon, asserting that the presumption of truthfulness charge shifted
the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and forced him to
prove his innocence. The District Court noted that similar instructions had met
with disfavor in the federal courts of appeal, but that such cases did not involve
1 Cupp v. Naughten, 94 S. Ct. 396, 398 (1973).
2 Id. This instruction is based on the following Oregon statute:
A witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption, however, may be over-
come by the manner in which he testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by
evidence affecting his character or motives, or by contradictory evidence. Where
the trial is by the jury, they are the exclusive judges of this credibility.
ORE. R v. STAT. § 44.370 (1971).
3 254 Ore. 124, 458 P.2d 432 (1969). In this decision, the Oregon Supreme Court held
that the presumption of truthfulness instruction neither operated exclusively in favor of the
state nor rendered nugatory the presumption of innocence. Id. at 130. 458 P.2d at 434-35.
4 State v. Naughten, 3 Ore.App. 241, 471 P.2d 830 (1970).
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appeals from state court convictions. Recognizing that the instruction was
proper under Oregon law, the District Court stated that "[i]n any event, the
giving of the instruction did not deprive petitioner of a federally protected con-
stitutional right."'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.' Noting that the in-
struction under discussion "has been almost universally condemned"7 and that
Naughten had not testified or called witnesses in his own behalf, the court went
on to say:
Thus, the clear effect of the challenged instruction was to place the burden
on Naughten to prove his innocence. This is so repugnant to the American
concept that it is offensive to any fair notion of due process of law.8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari9 to consider whether the
giving of this instruction in a state criminal trial so offended established notions
of due process as to deprive Naughten of a constitutionally fair trial.
On December 4, 1973, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
in a six-to-three decision (Cupp v. Naughten).o The Court, through Justice
Rehnquist, acknowledged the widespread criticism of the instruction by the
federal courts," noting that the courts of appeals "were primarily concerned
with directing inferior courts within the same jurisdiction to refrain from giving
the instruction because it was thought confusing, of little positive value to the
jury, or simply undesirable."' However, the Court went on to say that even
substantial unanimity among federal courts of appeals that the instruction should
not be given in United States district courts in their respective jurisdictions is
not by itself authority for declaring that such an instruction will invalidate a
conviction. Before a federal court may overturn such a conviction from a state
trial, "it must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erro-
neous, or even 'universally condemned,' but that it violated some right which was
guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
The Court adopted the proposition that a single instruction to a jury may
not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the
overall charge. 4 Although Cool v. United States5 held that an instruction by
5 94 S. Ct. at 398.
6 476 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1973).
7 Id. at 846. See United States v. Birmingham, 447 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1970); McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29
(Ist Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968); United States v. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d
333 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1967); United States
v. Persico, 349 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1965); see also United States v. Safley, 408 F.2d 603 '(4th Cir.
1969); Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1968); Stone v. United States,
379 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
8 476 F.2d at 847.
9 Cert. granted, 411 U.S. 947 (1973).
10 94 S. Ct. 396 (1973).
11 Such criticism is based on the concept that the presumption of truthfulness instruction
conflicts with the defendant's presumption of innocence, shifts the prosecution's burden of proof,
and interferes with the province of the jury to determine credibility.
12 94 S. Ct. at 400.
13 Id.
14 Id.; Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107 (1926).
15 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
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itself may indeed rise to the level of constitutional error, the Court recognized
that a conviction is commonly the culmination of several components of a trial
such as testimony by witnesses, the receipt of evidence, and instructions to the
jury. Justice Rehnquist therefore concluded that:
[Tjhe question is not whether the trial court failed to isolate and cure a
particular ailing instruction, but rather whether the ailing instruction by
itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due
process.'
1
In In re Winshipl the Court held that the due process clause requires states
in criminal prosecutions to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Rehn-
quist distinguished Winship from the instant case by noting that in the former,
the trial judge made an express finding that the state was not required in juvenile
proceedings to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the state's burden
of proof was emphasized during the course of the complete jury instructions in
the latter." The Court asserted, therefore, that the instruction neither shifted
the burden of proof nor negated the presumption of innocence. Further, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that:
It would be possible perhaps as a matter of abstract logic to contend that
any instruction suggesting that the jury should believe the testimony of a
witness might in some tangential respect "impinge" upon the right of the
defendant to have his guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt... The well
recognized and long established function of the trial judge to assist the jury
by such instructions is not emasculated by such abstract and conjectural
emanations from Winship."9
Because the jury was charged with regard to the presumption of innocence
and the state's duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court con-
cluded that whatever tangential undercutting of such propositions theoretically
resulted from the presumption of truthfulness instruction was not of constitu-
tional dimension. In the Court's view utilization of the presumption was neither
reversible error in terms of Winship's reasonable doubt mandate nor in terms of
Snyder v. Massachusetts' requirement of offense against "some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.""0
Noting that a timely objection was taken to the presumption of truthfulness
instruction, Justice Brennan's dissent reasoned that Naughten was denied due
process of law because the charge allowed the jury to convict him in spite of the
fact that the evidence may not have proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.21
The dissent also pointed out that prior to the presumption of truthfulness charge,
the trial court had instructed the jury that a presumption could be overcome by
16 94 S. Ct. at 400.
17 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
18 94 S. Ct. at 401.
19 Id.
20 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
21 94 S. Qt. at 402.
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proof which "outweighed or equaled" the presumption, but that in any other
event "the law expressly directed" a finding in accordance with the presump-
tion.2 2 In light of the fact that the state's case rested almost entirely on the testi-
mony of two eyewitnesses and two police officers and that the defendant neither
testified nor called any witnesses, these instructions, when considered together,
had the effect of transforming the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt to proving guilt by a preponderance of the evidence."3 Justice
Brennan thus concluded that the presumption violated the command of Winship
that "every fact necessary to constitute the crime" be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt,"4and that the harmless error doctrine of Chapman v. Californi a"
was inappropriate in view of the fact that Naughten's right to a fair trial was so
completely eroded.
This note will survey the background and rationale of the presumption of
truthfulness instruction in light of the Supreme Court's constitutional test for
statutory presumptions in criminal proceedings. Within this framework, the
alternative available to the Court in its consideration of Cupp u. Naughten will
be explored along with an analysis of its impact in the field of criminal presump-
tions.
II. History of the Presumption of Truthfulness Instruction
A. The Background
The rationale for the presumption of truthfulness instruction apparently
grew out of safeguards developed by the English courts for the ascertainment of
truth-primarily the requirement that all evidence be given under the sanction
of an oath:
This imposes the strongest obligation upon the conscience of the witness to
declare the whole truth that human wisdom can devise; a wilful violation
of the truth exposes him at once to temporal and to eternal punishment.
A judicial oath may be defined to be a solemn invocation of the ven-
geance of the Deity upon the witness, if he do [sic] not declare the whole
truth, as far as he knows it26
During the nineteenth century many of the common law rules of incom-
petency were applied to disqualify individuals from testifying."7 This, coupled
with the sanction of the oath, provided a sound basis in the minds of nineteenth
century commentators for the presumption that witnesses testify truthfully.2 8
The first reported usage of the presumption of truthfulness in American
case law is found in civil proceedings. In Hewlett v. Hewlett," an 1839 New
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 397 U.S. at 364.
25 386 U.S. 18, 23 '(1967).
26 See 1 T. Sraazcm, LAw OF E V ECE 22 (6th Am. ed. 1837).
27 See generally 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, ISTORY OF ENGLisH LAW 177-97 (1926).
28 See I B. JoNEs, TH. LAw OF EVmNCE IN CIVIL CASEs 27 (1896).
29 4 Edw. Ch. 7 '(N.Y. 1839).
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York insolvency proceeding, it was established that the insolvent had in his
possession a number of bonds; yet in the statement of his property effected under
oath, he omitted mention of the bonds and virtually declared that he owned no
such property. The Vice Chancellor held, "We cannot presume that, in his in-
solvency proceedings, [the insolvent] committed perjury or intended wrong. On
the contrary, it must be presumed that he exhibited a just and true account of
his debts and credits.""0 By the mid-nineteenth century, it was established that
in civil actions testimony by one party which was uncontradicted or undisputed
by the opposing party would be presumed true. 1
The first appearance of the presumption of truthfulness instruction in a
criminal proceeding is found in an 1892 Georgia case, Cornwall V. State.32
In that case the Georgia Supreme Court held that because none of the witnesses
who testified were impeached, it was not error to charge the jury in the following
manner:
The law presumes all witnesses who testify under oath are credible and
worthy of belief. The law presumes prima facie that no witness will wilfully,
knowingly and absolutely swear to what is false. The law does not impute
perjury to a witness, nor are you at liberty to do so.... There is no pre-
sumption touching the defendant's statement, no presumption that it is
true nor any presumption that it is untrue.33
The effect of this presumption obviously placed the defendant at a serious dis-
advantage vis-a-vis his accusers.
Early usage of the presumption of truthfulness instruction thus allowed im-
plementation of the presumption to be rendered inoperative only if the witness
was impeached or if his testimony was contradicted.
In 1891 the Supreme Court decided two cases, Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Ward4 and Quock Ting v. United States,35 in which it explicated the criteria
by which the jury could weigh the credibility of witnesses and their testimony.
The Court recognized that there are many aspects to the conduct of a witness
on the stand, such as the manner in which he answers questions, which may be
considered by the jury in determining the weight and credibility of his testi-
mony." Even in the absence of any direct, conflicting testimony, there may be
certain factors which will lead the jury to disregard his evidence:
He may be contradicted by the facts he states as completely as by direct
adverse testimony; and there may be so many omissions in his account of
particular transactions, or of his own conduct, as to discredit his whole story.
His manner, too, of testifying may give rise to doubts of 'his sincerity, and
create the impression that he is giving a wrong coloring to material facts.
All these things may properly be considered in determining the weight which
30 Id. at 16.
31 See Matthews v. Lanier, 33 Ark. 91 '(1878).
32 91 Ga. 277, 18 S.E. 154 (1892).
33 91 Ga. at 278, 18 S.E. at 154.
34 140 U.S. 76 (1891).
35 140 U.S. 417 (1891).
36 140 U.S. at 88.
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should be given to his statements, although there be no adverse verbal testi-
mony adduced.37
The development of the presumption of truthfulness instruction reached its
fruition when Judge William C. Mathes integrated the witness-credibility-nuance
factors explored by the Supreme Court in Aetna Life Insurance and Quock
Ting with the presumption itself." The instruction reads as follows:
You, as jurors, are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight their testimony deserves. A witness is presumed to speak the truth.
But this presumption may be outweighed by the manner in which the wit-
ness testifies, by the character of the testimony given, or by contradictory
evidence. You should carefully scrutinize the testimony given, the circum-
stances under which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence
which tends to indicate whether the witness is worthy of belief. Consider
each witness's intelligence, motive and state of mind, and demeanor and
manner while on the stand. Consider also any relation each witness may
bear to each side of the case; the manner in which each witness might be
affected by the verdict; and the extent to which, if at all, each witness is
either supported or contradicted by other evidence.39
The presumption of truthfulness instruction apparently became increasingly used
in federal criminal prosecutions following the publication of Judge Mathes' jury
instructions and forms.
B. Modern Application of the Presumption
The presumption of truthfulness instruction has been used in criminal pros-
ecutions with a variety of results in several states. Georgia is the only state, how-
ever, that has continued to apply the presumption without reservation. A series
of Georgia cases have cited the Cornwall decision with approval."0 The Georgia
Supreme Court has never enunciated its reason for utilization of the presumption
except to say that it is neither "an incorrect statement of the principle of the
law" nor "repugnant".4 However, a lower state court, the Georgia Court of
Appeals, has noted:
If this question were being presented to the court as an original proposition,
we might be inclined to hold that such a charge was reversible error. How-
ever, such a charge as here given has been held not reversible error in Corn-
wall v. State. We therefore think we are bound by that decision of the
37 140 U.S. at 420-21.
38 27 F.R.D. 39, 67-68 (1961).
39 Id. at 67. It is significaAit that in a more recent volume for judges and practitioners by
the publishers of Federal Rules Decisions, the wording has been changed to "[o]rdinarily, it is
assumed that a witness will speak the truth." W. MATHES & E. DEVITT, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, 111 (1965).
40 Tarver v. Silver, 180 Ga. 124, 178 S.E. 377 '(1935); Humphrey v. State, 141 Ga. 671,
81 S.E. 1034 (1914); Georgia Talc Co. v. Cohutta Talc Co.. 140 Ga. 245, 78 S.E. 905
(1913); Dollar v. Busha, 124 Ga. 521, 52 S.E. 615 (1905); Macon & B. R. Co. v. Revis, 119
Ga. 332, 46 S.E. 418 (1904); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Walthour, 117 Ga. 427, 43 S.E. 720
(1903); Georgia & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Cook, 114 Ga. 760, 40 S.E. 718 (1902); Georgia
Southern & Florida Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 111 Ga. 731, 36 S.E. 945 (1900).
41 Coates v. State, 192 Ga. 130, 136-37, 15 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1941).
[June 1974]
Supreme Court and are constrained to hold that the charge here excepted
to was not reversible error.
42
On the other hand, a number of states have declared that the law raises
no presumption one way or the other as to the credibility of a witness, and that
a contrary instruction constitutes an invasion of the province of the jury. 3 In
State v. Halverson44 the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that "[t]he ques-
tion of credibility is for the jury. It is not a matter upon which it should be
guided and controlled by general statements of inferences and rules of logic
announced by the court." ' It has been held to be error in Connecticut to tell
a jury that they are bound to believe a witness who was neither impeached nor
contradicted, whose story was credible, and in whose manner there was nothing
to shake their confidence. 6 The South Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that
in a criminal case, the error is emphasized where the presumption of credibility
is placed on a level with that of innocence."'
Other state courts have held that while the presumption of truthfulness in-
struction is not error, it is preferable that the instruction not be given. In a 1972
case, People v. Fountain," the Michigan Court of Appeals found no error in
the instruction itself, yet observed:
[W]e think the trial court should not give the instruction upon retrial. Such
an instruction has been held to derogate from the jury's sole right to deter-
mine the credibility of witnesses, and to conflict with the presumption of
innocence of a defendant.... Additionally, it has been said that it shifts
the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt upon
the presentation of even the slightest incriminating testimony.
49
Even State v. Kessler,5" cited by the Supreme Court in Cupp v. Naughten as up-
holding the validity of the presumption of truthfulness instruction in Oregon
against constitutional attack, recognizes that:
Although it might be preferable not to instruct the jury in criminal cases
where defendant does not take the stand that a witness is presumed to
speak the truth, we find no error in giving the instruction if accompanied
by an explanation of how the presumption can be overcome. 51
On the federal level the United States Courts of Appeals have generally
held it improper for a trial judge to instruct the jury that witnesses are presumed
42 Eidson v. State, 66 Ga.App. 765. 768-69, 19 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1942).
43 See e.g., Mullaney v. C.H. Goss Co., 97 Vt. 82, 122 A. 430 (1923); State v. Halvorson,
103 Minn. 265, 114 N.W. 957 (1908); State v. Taylor, 57 S.C. 483, 35 S.E. 729 (1900);
Isely v. Illinois Central K. Co., 88 Wis. 453, 60 N.W. 794 (1894).
44 103 Minn. 265, 114 N.W. 957 (1908).
45 Id. at 267, 114 N.W. at 958. See also Chicago Union Traction Co. v. O'Brien. 219 Ill.
303, 76 N.E. 341 (1905); Hauser v. People, 210 Ill. 253, 71 N.E. 416 (1904).
46 Bradley v. Gorham, 77 Conn. 211, 58 A. 698 (1904).
47 State v. Taylor, 57 S.C. 483, 35 S.E. 729 (1900).
48 43 Mich. App. 489, 204 N.W.2d 532 (1972).
49 Id. at 499, 204 N.W.2d at 538.
50 254 Ore. 124, 458 P.2d 432 '(1969).
51 Id. at 130, 458 P.2d at 435.
NOTES 1107[Vol. 49:1101]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
to tell the truth. In United States v. Bilotti" the court observed that the instruc-
tion serves no useful purpose, may be misleading, and trial courts should abstain
front using it. The court held in United States v. Persico that:
This charge presents a confusing conglomeration of presumption of inno-
cence of a defendant, reasonable doubt, and credibility of witnesses. The
standards for evaluating the guilt or innocence of a defendant are not appli-
cable in determining the credibility of a witness. We do not have a trial
within a trial on the question whether witnesses are guilty of committing
perjury. The charge seems to place a burden on the defense to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the Government's witnesses are guilty of perjury.5 3
In United States v. Meisch, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that,
"In addition to derogating from the jury's sole right to determine the credibility
of witnesses, [this instruction] conflicts with the presumption of innocence of a
defendant."54
In some cases, however, the federal courts, although expressing disapproval
of instructions that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth, have nevertheless
stated that such instructions do not constitute error. In Stone v. United States55
Chief Justice Burger, who joined with the majority in Cupp v. Naughten, ex-
pressed the following viewpoint while sitting as a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
[S]uch a charge has a tendency to impinge on the presumption of innocence.
Lurking in such an instruction is the risk that the jury might conclude that
they were required to accept the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses at
face value, particularly when it is not contradicted by other witnesses....
However, here no objection was made to the instruction, and, in addi-
tion, the trial judge supplemented the challenged paragraph with further
instructions for the jury's use in measuring the credibility of witnesses. Tak-
ing the instruction as a whole, we find no error ...
In our view the form of instruction used here should be discontinued
in the future.
56
Under certain circumstances, such as where the presumption that witnesses
told the truth operated exclusively in favor of the prosecution's witnesses, it has
been held reversible error to instruct the jury that such a presumption existed.
Thus, in United States v. Johnson,5" where the entire case was based on testi-
mony of the government's witnesses and defense counsel objected to the pre-
sumption of truthfulness instruction, the court held that the error was sub-
stantial; and that since it was maintained over defendant's specific objection,
52 380 F.2d 649, 656 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967).
53 349 F.2d 6, 11 (2d Cir. 1965).
54 370 F.2d 768, 773-74 (3d Cir. 1966). Attempts to weaken the presumption of in-
nocence have been nullified by the courts. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952); Reynolds v. United States, 238 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1956).
55 379 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
56 Id. at 147 (emphasis added); See also United States v. Gray, 464 F.2d 632 (8th Cir.
1972); United States v. Reid, 469 F.2d 1094 '(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Stroble, 431
F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1970); Knapp v. United States, 316 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1963).
57 371 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1967).
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the conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted. 8 Further, it has been
held that even in the absence of a timely objection such an instruction could be
grounds for reversal under the doctrine of plain error. 9 In McMillen v. United
States" the defendant's substantial rights were invaded when the trial court com-
bined use of the presumption of truthfulness instruction with a failure to caution
the jury regarding the testimony of accomplice witnesses when such was the only
evidence linking the defendant to the crime. It should be noted, however, that
the court went on to say:
All that we have said indicates that a trial judge in a criminal case ought
not to refer to a "presumption of truthfulness." It does not indicate that in
the absence of objection, this instruction is "plain error". ... As is always
so, the particular circumstances of each case must be carefully surveyed
before such an unusual step is taken.61
Where the presumption of truthfulness instruction is accompanied by an
adequate explanation of how the presumption may be overcome and especially
where the defendant either testifies himself or calls witnesses in his behalf so that
the presumption applies also to defense witnesses, it has been held that utilization
of the instruction is not so prejudicial as to require reversal. In Unites States V.
Boone62 the court ruled that the instruction, although suspect because of its detri-
mental effect on the presumption of innocence, constituted harmless error in view
of the fact that the trial judge properly instructed the jury how to determine the
credibility of witnesses and that the defendant introduced substantial testimony
in his behalf. 3 Also, where no exception was taken, it has been held that the
instruction did not constitute plain or reversible error when the testimony and
other evidence upon which the convictions rested were adequate under the
circumstances."
Cupp u. Naughten is therefore unique in that it presents a situation where
the defendant neither called any witnesses in his own behalf nor testified him-
self; the prosecution called two eyewitnesses and two police officers; defense
counsel made a timely objection to the presumption of truthfulness instruction;
and yet the Court, in the face of overwhelming authority concerned with the
maintenance of constitutional guarantees, sustained the use of the instruction.
III. The Constitutional Test for Criminal Statutory Presumptions
The United States Supreme Court has created a long-evolved constitutional
test for criminal statutory presumptions. 5 This test has been utilized in de-
58 Id. at 805.
59 FED. R. CRm. P.52(b); see United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160'(1936).
60 386 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968).
61 Id. at 33. See also United States v. Birmingham, 447 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Evans, 398 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1968).
62 401 F.2d 659 "(3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 933 (1969).
63 Id. at 661. See United States v. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1967).
64 See United States v. Harper, 443 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851
(1971) ; United States v. Safley, 408 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1969) ; Harrison v. United States, 387
F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1968).
65 See generally Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22
STAN. L. REv. 341, 344-47 (1970); Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling
the Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 157 (1970).
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termining the constitutionality of a legislatively created presumption which
operates as an element of a criminal offense. For example, if the prosecution
establishes facts A and B, fact C will be statutorily presumed to have been
proved. Thus A and B are referred to as the "facts proved" while C is the "fact
presumed." If sufficient evidence is proffered to render the presumption in-
operative, the presumption is said to have been overcome or rebutted. The test
requires that the legislatively prescribed "fact presumed" must comport with
certain standards in order to be constitutionally acceptable. The Supreme Court
avoided reference to this constitutional test throughout the course of the majority
opinion in Cupp; however, examination of the test is essential for determining
the significance of the case since it involved a statutorily created presumption
that witnesses testify truthfully. In this respect Cupp is unique among both state
and federal decisions which have considered the presumption of truthfulness.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court set forth a number of different stand-
ards by which the validity of statutory presumptions were to be measured. Since
the decision of Mobile, J. & K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed,66 it has been fairly certain
that the due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments will
void the operation of presumptive language which works in an unreasonable
and capricious manner. Since the decision of Bailey U. Alabaman 6 it has likewise
been clear that presumptive language may not be used to circumvent constitu-
tional rights." Although the Court has occasionally indicated in dicta that more
stringent scrutiny will be given to presumptions operating against criminal de-
fendants than to those operating in civil cases,69 the Court has used the same
formulae to judge the legitimacy of presumptions in both areas.7"
In the Turnipseed case the Court held that a presumption was constitutional
so long as there was a "rational connection" between the fact to be proved and
the fact presumed." The first criminal case to adopt the Turnipseed formula
was Yee Hem v. United States."2 Since Yee Hem, at least two other tests for the
constitutionality of statutory presumptions have been applied;" in Tot v. United
States, 4 however, one of the two tests was explicitly rejected and the other was
reduced to the status of a corollary." The Tot decision left the rational connec-
tion test as the primary test for the validity of statutory presumptions.
Two subsequent cases which influenced the development of the rational
connection test adequately indicate its application. In one, United States v.
Gainey,"6 the defendant was convicted for carrying on the business of an un-
66 219 U.S. 35 '(1910).
67 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
68 Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases:
A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALa L.J. 165 (1969).
69 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
70 Ashford & Risinger, supra note 68, at 166.
71 219 U.S. at 43.
72 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
73 One was whether the legislature might have made it a crime to do the thing from which
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bonded distiller. A presumption permitted the jury to infer from a defendant's
presence at an illegal still that he was carrying on the business of a distiller. Since
it was well known that bootleggers hid their stills in covert places and that few
people not engaged in such illegal activity were to be found at these hideaways,
the Court held that there was a rational connection between participation in the
illegal business and presence at the site sufficient to validate the presumption."7
The second case, United States v. Romano,78 involved a presumption identical
to hat in Gainey except that it authorized the jury to infer from the defendant's
presence at an illegal still that he had possession, custody, or control of the still.
The Court held that there was not a requisite rational connection between
presence at the site and the crime of possession in order to uphold the presump-
tion because many people might be present at the site without being guilty of
possession."'
In Leary v. United States,"0 the defendant Timothy Leary had been con-
victed for violating federal marijuana laws by possessing marijuana that had
been illegally imported into the United States with knowledge that it had been
illegally imported. Two presumptions aided the prosecution. First, any mari-
juana discovered in the United States was presumed to be illegally imported;
and secondly, any person possessing the marijuana was presumed to know that
it was illegally imported. By means of the rational connection test the Court held
this second presumption invalid."' The Court went on to explain:
The upshot of Tot, Gainey, and Romano is, we think, that a criminal statu-
tory presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary," and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact
on which it is made to depend.
2
Thus, in Leary the Court committed itself to the proposition that rational con-
nection means "more likely than not."
In Turner v. United Statesas the defendant was convicted for violating a
statute similar to the one in Leary except that it involved heroin. In Turner,
again as in Leary, the prosecution only introduced evidence of possession although
the offense was possession of imported heroin with knowledge that it had been
illegally imported. Turner's conviction was upheld on the ground that unless it
has been illegally imported, heroin, unlike marijuana, is virtually never found
in the United States. The Court took notice of the facts that no heroin may be
imported legally and that heroin is domestically produced in minute quantities.
From this premise the Court concluded that:
Concededly, heroin could be made in this country, at least in tiny amounts.
But the overwhelming evidence is that heroin consumed in the United
77 Id. at 67-68.
78 382 U.S. 136 '(1965).
79 Id. at 141.
80 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
81 Id. at 37.
82 Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
83 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
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States is illegally imported. To possess heroin is to possess imported heroin.
Whether judged by the more-likely-than-not standard applied in Leary v.
United States or by the more exacting reasonable doubt standard normally
applicable in criminal cases, [the presumption] is valid insofar as it permits
a jury to infer that heroin possessed in this country is a smuggled drug.
84
Therefore, the Court approved an inference of knowledge from the fact of pos-
sessing smuggled heroin because "'[c]ommon sense' ... tells us that those who
traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that the product they deal in is
smuggled. ,." At the same time, the court rejected the presumption that pos-
session of unstamped cocaine was prima facie evidence that the drug was not
purchased in or from the original stamped container because a "'reasonable
possibility" existed that the defendant "stole the cocaine himself or obtained it
from a stamped package in possession of the actual thief."8
In Turner, therefore, the Court appeared to be indicating that it was moving
toward an application of the reasonable doubt standard to statutory criminal
presumptions in lieu of the rational connection test." It seemed implicit in
Turner that the rational connection test could be successfully challenged when
applied to criminal presumptions, and even more probable after the decision of
In re Winship where the Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.M
8
IV. Cupp v. Naughten and the Presumption of Truthfulness
Within the Framework of the Constitutional Test
Taken in consideration with the standards enunciated by the Court in
Leary and Turner, Cupp u. Naughten. provides a unique opportunity to analyze
the constitutionality of a statutory presumption of truthfulness and the contem-
porary logic of the presumption itself.
As we have seen, during the nineteenth century many of the common law
rules of incompetency were applied to disqualify individuals from testifying.'
This, along with the solemn oath, was viewed as the fundamental justification
for the presumption that witnesses testify truthfully. However, the common law
rules of incompetency have undergone for a century a process of piecemeal re-
vision by statutes so that today most of the former grounds for excluding a
witness altogether have been converted into mere grounds for impeaching his
credibility." Therefore to the extent that the presumption of truthfulness found
its roots in antiquity, contemporary developments in the law of evidence have
stripped it of its raison d'etre.
In commenting upon a witness' knowledge, Wigmore says:
84 Id. at 415-16 (emphasis added).
85 Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 423-24 (emphasis added).
87 Note, supra note 65, at 352-53.
88 397 U.S. at 364.
89 See text accompanying note 27, supra.
90 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THr. LAW OF EVIDaNCE 139 (2d ed. 1972).
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It is obviously impossible to speak with accuracy of a witness' "knowledge"
as that which the principles of testimony require. If the law received as
absolute knowledge what he had to offer, then only one witness would be
needed on any one matter; for the fact asserted would be demonstrated.
When a thing is known to be, it is; and that would be the end of the in-quiry ....
Hence, a witness cannot be assumed beforehand, by the law, to know
things; the most it can assume is that he thinks he knows....
The practical tests, then, and the detailed rules, are in strictness con-
cerned with Observation and not with Knowledge.9 1
If we accept the validity of Wigmore's observation, our next inquiry involves the
determination of variables which comprise the probability that a witness testified
accurately.
In computing the probability that a witness testified accurately, we are
faced with many of the same problems which arise in computing the ultimate
probability of guilt. The probability that a witness testified accurately is a
product of all the independent probabilities that go into the reliable communica-
tion of information. 2 It has been suggested that this may be expressed as the
product of the probabilities:
(1) that the witness was not mistaken in what he saw; (2) that he has re-
membered what he thinks he saw; (3) that he has meant to tell us what
he remembered; (4) that he has actually been able to communicate what




This methodology suggests that an attempt to compute so amorphous a determi-
nation as the credibility of witnesses involves nuances and imponderables so
elusive as to doom any such attempt.
At this point, it becomes obvious that a statutory presumption of truthful-
ness cannot meet the constitutional standards prescribed by Leary and Turner.
In view of the above it would be difficult to reasonably contend that there is a
"rational connection" between credibility itself on the one hand and the status
of a sworn witness on the other. It would strain logic to assert that it is "more
likely than not" that a witness will testify truthfully. The presumption fares even
worse under the more exacting reasonable doubt standard hypothesized in
Turner. The dissent in Cupp recognized that the presumption cannot meet such
a standard by noting that:
In the instant case, common sense does not dictate that a prosecution witness
who has sworn or affirmed to tell the truth will inevitably do so, and there
is surely a reasonable possibility that he will fail to do so.94
It is significant that the dissent's analysis of Cupp in relation to Turner is the
91 2 J. WGMOaa, EVMNCE § 650 "(3d ed. 1940).
92 Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1088
(1968).
93 Id.
94 94 S. Ct. at 403.
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only reference to the constitutional test throughout the course of the decision.
Nowhere in the text of the majority opinion is there even a recognition of the
constitutional test for statutory presumptions. The Couxt merely sustained the
presumption by citing McNabb v. United States" which declared that "review
by [the Supreme] Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best
further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands ap-
propriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise
of its jurisdiction."98 The Court thus bypassed an opportunity to expand upon
further application of the reasonable doubt standard to criminal statutory pre-
sumptions as suggested in Turner. Consideration of the presumption in the
framework of the constitutional test would most surely have dictated a determi-
nation of its unconstitutionality.
Yet Cupp u. Naughten, unlike other cases demonstrating the presumption
of truthfulness instruction, involved utilization of a statutory version of the pre-
sumption. Although it may be argued that the statute merely permits the pre-
sumption of truthfulness instruction to be given and does not mandate its use,
it must be remembered that all presumptions of elements of a crime in criminal
prosecutions are permissive. Therefore at least a recognition of the consti-
tutional test for statutory presumptions would have been more in keeping with
previous decisions of the Court.
Aside from indicating the Court's disinclination to void a statutory presump-
tion by means of the constitutional test, the Cupp decision may portend that the
Court is unwilling to go beyond the "rational connection" test toward the "rea-
sonable doubt" standard. Evidence of this unwillingness is the Court's attempt
to distinguish In re Winship. Although Winship held that the fourteenth amend-
ment requires the states to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to every
element of the offense, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that whatever "tangential
undercutting" of the beyond a reasonable doubt guarantee may result from a
presumption of truthfulness instruction is not of "constitutional dimension." '
From this we may infer that the rational connection test for statutory presump-
tions is here to stay. Cupp's greatest impact therefore lies not in what the Court
said but in what it did not say.
V. Conclusion
The presumption of truthfulness served to provide the jury with a founda-
tion of certainty in the performance of its fact-finding process. Substantial changes
in the development of the law have rendered the rationale for the presumption
questionable at best. The presumption operates full force against a defendant
such as Naughten who neither calls witnesses in his own behalf nor takes the
stand himself. The following constitutional arguments can be made on his be-
half: (1) the defendant no longer enjoys any benefits from the presumption of
95 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
96 94 S. Ct. at 401.
97 A permissive presumption allows the jury to find the presumed fact when the fact from
which it is presumed is proved, but does not require such a finding.
98 94 S. Ct. at 401-02.
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innocence; (2) the defendant is no longer provided a jury trial upon the elements
of the crime established by the prosecution witnesses because he is deprived of the
untrammeled response of the jury as to that element; (3) the province of the
jury to determine credibility is invaded; (4) the prosecution's burden of proof
is lessened from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to a mere "preponderance of the
evidence"; (5) the defendant may be punished not as a result of all elements of
the crime having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but for not having
risen to his own defense.9
Aside from the Court's disinclination to weigh the statutory presumption of
truthfulness by the standards of Leary and Turner, Cupp v. Naughten is signifi-
cant because it reflects a somewhat inflexible approach. Nowhere in the course of
his opinion does Justice Rehnquist recognize that the presumption may work
more harm to a defendant who presents no case as opposed to one who calls
witnesses in his own behalf. Even the Oregon courts have asserted that the claim
of error resulting from utilization of the instruction merits serious consideration
when the defendant does not put on a case.' Also, there is no recommendation
in the majority opinion to the effect that the instruction ought not be used in the
future. This is a significant omission in view of the "universal condemnation" of
the instruction by not only the federal courts, but also most of the state courts
which have considered the matter.'0 By stamping the presumption of truthful-
ness instruction with its imprimatur of approval, the Court has foreclosed con-
sideration of situations in which use of the instruction may have a deleterious
effect on the administration of criminal justice.
In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Gainey, Justice Black observed
that:
[S]tatutes creating presumptions cannot be treated as fungible, that is, as
interchangeable for all uses and all purposes. The validity of each pre-
sumption must be determined in the light of the particular consequences
that flow from its use. When matters of trifling moment are involved,
presumptions may be more freely accepted, but when consequences of vital
importance to litigants and to the administration of justice are at stake, a
more careful scrutiny is necessary.
10 2
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not operate to enforce
upon the states a uniform code of criminal procedure. The states may "choose
the methods and practices by which crime is brought to book, so long as they
observe those ultimate dignities of man which the United States Constitution
assures.' 0 3 The Court's approach in Cupp v. Naughten serves neither the best
interests of the states nor the fundamental guarantees of criminal defendants.
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